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COMMENTS
CLEARLY UNCONVINCING:
HOW HEIGHTENED EVIDENTIARY
STANDARDS IN JUDICIAL BYPASS
HEARINGS CREATE AN UNDUE BURDEN
UNDER WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH
BY HALEY HAWKINS*
Currently, thirty-seven states have parental involvement laws that require a
minor seeking to access abortion care to consult or obtain consent from a parent
before undergoing the procedure. In these states, a minor’s only hope for getting
around this obstacle is judicial bypass—a proceeding in which a minor must
convince a judge that she should be able to obtain an abortion without parental
involvement, based on two Supreme Court-articulated factors. Many of these
states impose heightened evidentiary standards—namely, the “clear and convincing
evidence” standard—in these proceedings where the minor bears the burden of proof.
This Comment argues that imposing heightened evidentiary standards in
judicial bypass proceedings creates an undue burden on a minor’s right to
abortion under the strengthened standard set out in Whole Woman’s Health
v. Hellerstedt. Thus, the imposition of these heightened evidentiary standards
in this context is unconstitutional.
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Kiera was sure that if she told her mom, who volunteered for an antiabortion group, that she wanted to end her pregnancy, she’d be out
of the house for good. But when Kiera confided in a school
counselor, she learned about another option: [s]he could ask a
judge for permission to have an abortion. Her panic melted away.
“I thought, ‘This will save me,’” she recalls. She started socking away
every dollar she could get her hands on—lunch money, tips from
her waitressing job. And she started calling courthouses.1

INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has stated that “[a] child, merely on account of
his minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution.”2
However, in the United States, the individual rights of a minor are
significantly limited, especially the minor’s ability to make medical
decisions.3 This limitation is grounded in the general legal consensus
that the right of parents to choose how to raise their children prevails
in situations where the wishes of the minor and the parent are in
conflict.4 While courts and legislatures have established certain
exceptions to this general rule,5 a minor’s right to consent to medical

1. Molly Redden, This is How Judges Humiliate Teens Who Want Abortions, MOTHER
JONES (Sept./Oct. 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/10/teenabortion-judicial-bypass-parental-notification.
2. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979) (explaining that, although children
are not exempt from constitutional protections, the law does operate differently for
minors seeking to invoke such protections).
3. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Rosato, The Ultimate Test of Autonomy: Should Minors Have a
Right to Make Decisions Regarding Life-Sustaining Treatment?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 17
(1996) (highlighting the general common law rule that minors have no medical
decision making power, even with regard to life-sustaining treatment).
4. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (carving out a “liberty
[interest] of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control”); see also J. SHOSHANNA EHRLICH, WHO DECIDES? THE ABORTION
RIGHTS OF TEENS 40 (2006) (noting that the Supreme Court has most recently “sh[ied]
away from the ‘Individualistic Model’ when faced with cases involving actual or
potential disputes between parents and children” and, instead, defers to the “parental
control over the ‘upbringing and education’ of their children”); Lawrence Schlam &
Joseph P. Wood, Informed Consent to the Medical Treatment of Minors: Law and Practice, 10
HEALTH MATRIX 141, 149 (2000) (noting that the emphasis on parents’ rights in
medical decision making situations for minors rests on the presumption that parents
will act in the best interest of the child because of “natural bonds of affection”).
5. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 681–82 (1977) (striking
down a state statute that prohibited minors under sixteen-years-old from obtaining
contraception); see also Minors’ Access to Contraceptive Services, GUTTMACHER INST. (June
1, 2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/minors-access-contraceptive-
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procedures remains extremely limited, including the right to consent
to have an abortion.6
In 1973, the Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade7 that women have a
fundamental right to abortion based on the substantive due process
right to privacy.8 However, since this landmark ruling, a limiting
framework has emerged that governs when minors may exercise this
right. Seeking to protect parental rights and provide a check on
minors’ decision making, the majority of states have enacted parental
involvement laws.9 Laws of this type require parental consent, parental
notification, or both, before the minor obtains an abortion.10 States
are permitted to pass these laws, so long as the statute provides a
judicial bypass option by which a minor may obtain a waiver of parental
consent or notification by court order.11 In Bellotti v. Baird,12 the Court
enumerated two situations in which a waiver of parental consent or
notification may be granted: (1) when the minor is mature enough to
make the decision independently to have an abortion, or (2) when an
abortion is in the minor’s best interest, even though she cannot make
the decision independently.13

services (stating that “21 states and the District of Columbia explicitly allow all minors
to consent to contraceptive services”).
6. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (ruling
that a minor’s right to abortion may be subject to parental consent).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. Id. at 153 (concluding that regardless of whether the right of privacy is rooted
in the personal liberty protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the Court
believed, or the reserved rights of the Ninth Amendment, as the district court ruled,
the Constitution safeguards a woman’s freedom to terminate her pregnancy).
9. See Abortion and Parental Involvement Laws: A Threat to Young Women’s Health and
Safety, ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH (Dec. 2013), http://www.advocatesforyouth.org/
storage/advfy/documents/abortion%20and%20parental%20involvement%20laws.pdf.
10. See id. (explaining that parental involvement laws come in two forms: “those
that require parental notification and those that require parental consent before a
young person seeks abortion services,” and further noting that twenty-one states
require parental consent only, thirteen states require parental notification only, and
five states require both consent and notification); see also State Laws and Policies:
Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, GUTTMACHER INST. (June 1, 2018), https://w
ww.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/parental-involvement-minors-abortions
(highlighting that thirty-four states allow minors to obtain an abortion without parental
consent, notification, or alternative judicial waiver in the case of a medical emergency,
and fifteen states allow a minor to do so in cases of abuse, assault, incest, or neglect).
11. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979).
12. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
13. Id. at 643–44.
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In these judicial bypass proceedings, the minor bears the burden of
proof for establishing her “maturity” or “best interests.”14 However, the
Court in Bellotti did not specify the evidentiary standard required for a
minor to prove she is mature enough to obtain an abortion or that it
is in her best interests; instead, the Court left this determination up to
the state legislatures.15 This has resulted in varying evidentiary
requirements and appellate standards of review across the country.16
For example, fifteen of the thirty-seven states with parental
involvement laws require “clear and convincing evidence” to prove that
a minor is mature enough to obtain an abortion or that it is in her best
interests.17 In light of the widespread use of this heightened evidentiary
standard and the substantial obstacle it places in the way of minors, this
Comment will argue that heightened evidentiary standards in judicial
bypass hearings place an undue burden on minors seeking abortion
care without parental involvement based on the strengthened undue
burden test articulated in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,18 and
despite the Court’s ruling in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive

14. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 515–16 (1990) (citing
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634) (“A State does not have to bear the burden of proof on the
issues of maturity or best interests. The principal opinion in Bellotti indicates that a
State may require the minor to prove these facts in a bypass procedure.”).
15. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643–44 (using the terms “best interests” and “maturity”
without providing definitions).
16. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. Alaska, 375 P.3d 1122, 1149,
1154 (Alaska 2016) (overturning a parental involvement statute that required clear
and convincing evidence based, in part, on the fact that “in close cases, a higher
standard of proof will place the risk of erroneous factfinding on the child” (quoting
Evans v. McTaggart, 88 P.3d 1078, 1095 (Alaska 2004) (Fabe, C.J., dissenting))); In re
Petition of Anonymous 1, 558 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Neb. 1997) (deciding in favor of the
clear and convincing evidence standard in judicial bypass proceedings based on the
“magnitude of the decision at issue, the fact that the proceedings are ex parte in
nature, and [the] recogni[tion] that any evidence will usually satisfy the
preponderance of the evidence standard”). While an expedited appeals process is
required for judicial bypass hearings where a waiver has been denied, states have
varying appellate standards of review that prevent a meaningful check on trial court
judges’ decisions. See Caroline A. Placey, Comment, Of Judicial Bypass Procedures, Moral
Recusal, and Protected Political Speech: Throwing Pregnant Minors Under the Campaign Bus,
56 EMORY L.J. 693, 707–08 (2006) (citing examples of states with wide-ranging
appellate standards of review for judicial bypass hearings from “de novo” to “abuse of
discretion”); id. at 707 (“A survey of published judicial bypass appellate opinions
reveals that varied judgments result from similar facts, even in a single state.”).
17. GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 10.
18. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
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Health.19 Furthermore, the outcome of this strengthened analysis
negates the ruling in Akron Center for Reproductive Health with respect to
the Court’s assertion that the clear and convincing evidence standard
does not impose an undue burden on minors’ right to abortion.
Part I will provide an overview of minors’ abortion rights and the
evolution of the judicial bypass process. It will also look at the purpose
and function of the clear and convincing evidence standard in general
and as applied to judicial bypass proceedings. Then, it will examine
the Court’s holding in Akron Center for Reproductive Health and outline
the structure of the Whole Woman’s Health analysis.20 Part II will apply
the strengthened undue burden test set out in Whole Woman’s Health to
the Court’s analysis of the clear and convincing evidence standard
permitted under Akron Center for Reproductive Health and argue that
these heightened evidentiary standards create an undue burden and
are therefore unconstitutional.21 Finally, this Comment will conclude
that the use of the clear and convincing evidence standard in judicial
bypass proceedings creates an undue burden under the strengthened
undue burden test in Whole Woman’s Health, and will recommend a
model parental involvement statute that comports with due process
standards enumerated in the Whole Woman’s Health ruling.22
I. BACKGROUND
This Section will provide an overview of the information needed to
determine the constitutionality of the imposition of the clear and
convincing evidence standard within judicial bypass proceedings. It
will first explain how judicial bypass is situated within abortion
jurisprudence overall and the governing standards of judicial bypass.23
Next, it will outline the purpose and function of the clear and
convincing evidence standard, both generally and in the context of
judicial bypass.24 Then, the Section will provide an overview of the
Court’s decision in Akron Center for Reproductive Health, and its approval
of the clear and convincing evidence standard in judicial bypass

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

497 U.S. 502 (1990).
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Conclusion.
See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.B.
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proceedings.25 Last, it will explain the strengthened undue burden
standard articulated in Whole Woman’s Health.26
A. Judicial Bypass within the Evolution of Abortion Jurisprudence
In Roe, the Supreme Court ruled that abortion is a fundamental right
encompassed in the right to privacy.27 In addition to situating the right
to abortion within substantive due process, the Court in Roe also set up
a trimester framework, which provided that a woman’s right to
abortion without regulation decreased each trimester of the
pregnancy.28 Specifically, during the first trimester, the choice of
whether to abort was to be left to the woman and her doctor;29 during
the second trimester, states were permitted to impose abortion
regulations to protect women’s health;30 and during the third
trimester, states were permitted to restrict or prohibit abortion, except
where an abortion would be necessary to preserve the life or health of
the woman.31 However, despite carefully crafting this approach to
protect the abortion right—which was later replaced by the fetal
viability standard and undue burden test32—the Court in Roe left open
the question of how the abortion right was to be applied to minors, other
than the general assertion that the right to abortion is not absolute.33
Three years later, the Court, in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth,34 ruled that a state could not authorize a blanket parental
veto over a minor’s right to abortion.35 In doing so, the Court addressed
one of the primary justifications asserted in favor of parental involvement
laws and regulations pertaining to such laws—the preservation of parental
rights and family cohesion—by stating:

25. See infra Section I.C.
26. See infra Section I.D.
27. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
28. See id. at 164–65.
29. Id. at 163 (“[P]rior to this ‘compelling’ point, the attending physician, in
consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the state, that
in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.”).
30. Id. at 164.
31. Id. at 164–65.
32. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see infra note 47
and accompanying text.
33. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (specifying that the right to abortion “is not absolute
and subject to some limitations”).
34. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
35. Id. at 74.
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It is difficult . . . to conclude that providing a parent with absolute
power to overrule a determination, made by a physician and his
minor patient, to terminate the patient’s pregnancy will serve to
strengthen the family unit. Neither is it likely that such veto power
will enhance parental authority or control where the minor and the
nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the very
existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family
structure.36

This set the stage for perhaps the most important Supreme Court
decision regarding a minor’s right to receive an abortion, which came
three years later in Bellotti. In that case, the Court addressed the
question of the constitutionality of parental involvement statutes for
minors seeking abortions.37 The plaintiffs consisted of a “class of
unmarried minors in Massachusetts who [had] adequate capacity to
give valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who [did] not wish
to involve their parents.”38 The minors challenged the constitutionality
of the Massachusetts parental consent statute, arguing that minors of
“adequate capacity” are capable of informed consent with respect to
abortion procedures.39 The Court ruled that a parental consent statute
did not violate a minor’s right to abortion, as long as the state also
provided a bypass process through which a minor can petition for a
waiver of parental consent. The minor can obtain a judicial waiver by
showing that either she is “mature enough and well enough informed
to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician,
independently of her parents’ wishes, or . . . that even if she is not able
to make the decision independently, the desired abortion would be in
her best interests.”40 The “maturity” determination remains steeped in
criticism and judicial application of the standard has varied widely.41
36. Id. at 75.
37. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979) (hearing a challenge to a state statute
requiring parental consent for a minor to receive an abortion, enacted in light of the
Court’s holding in Danforth).
38. Id. at 626 (noting that the co-plaintiffs also included the Parents Aid Society,
Inc., William Baird, the Society’s founder, and Gerald Zupnick, M.D.).
39. See id. at 628 (discussing the district court’s conclusion that “a substantial
number of females under the age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent”
(quoting Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847, 855 (D. Mass. 1975))).
40. Id. at 643–44.
41. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 475 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (asserting that “[i]t is difficult
to conceive of any reason . . . that would justify a finding that an immature woman’s best
interests would be served by forcing her to endure pregnancy and childbirth against her
will”); see also HELENA SILVERSTEIN, GIRLS ON THE STAND: HOW COURTS FAIL PREGNANT
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The Court later clarified the “best interests” consideration by opining
that finding parental involvement is not in the minor’s best interests is
equivalent to finding that an abortion is in the minor’s best interest
and, thus, either articulation of the standard is permissible.42 However,
other than the decision in Bellotti, there is little judicial guidance on
the meaning of the “best interests” standard in this particular type of
proceeding; rather, since the “circumstances in which [the abortion]
issue arises will vary widely,” the “best interests” determination necessarily
requires a case-by-case analysis.43
The Court articulated three reasons for requiring a judicial bypass
process with the “maturity” and “best interests” considerations: (1) “the
peculiar vulnerability of children”; (2) “their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner”; and (3) “the importance of
the parental role in child rearing.”44 The Court first explained that
minors’ due process rights are coextensive with those of adults, but can
be altered to “account for children’s vulnerability and their needs for
concern, . . . sympathy, and . . . paternal attention.”45 It then went on
to define the states’ ability to limit minors’ decision making power with
respect to “important, affirmative choices with potentially serious
consequences.”46 Finally, with regard to the third prong of the
justification for limitations on minors’ right to abortion, the Court
relied on long-standing precedent supporting parents’ interest in
exercising care and custody over their children, and all of the requisite
checks on minors’ autonomy in decision making that comes along with
this interest.47 In terms of the actual structure of the judicial bypass
MINORS 26 (2007) (noting that the Court’s lack of guidance on the meaning of “maturity”
and “best interests” gives judges substantial discretion in these determinations).
42. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 297–98 (1997) (per curiam).
43. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642–43 (contemplating that alternatives, such as marriage, adoption,
or raising the child with family support may be “relevant to the minor’s best interests”).
44. Id. at 634.
45. Id. at 635 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971)) (using the juvenile justice system as an example of context in
which minors retain their due process rights but are afforded extra procedural
protections in light of their vulnerability).
46. Id. at 635–36 (using a First Amendment case to illustrate the point). But see
Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1982)
(distinguishing the denial of minors’ right to abortion from other types of temporary
denials of minors’ rights (i.e. underage marriage), by explaining that “[g]iving birth
to an unwanted child involves an irretrievable change in position for a minor”).
47. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637–39; see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35
(1925) (holding that choice of children’s education was encompassed by parents’ liberty
interest to “direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”);
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process, the Court in Bellotti stipulated that the process must “be
completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an
effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained,” but did not
specify any other procedural requirements.48
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,49 the Court
subsequently affirmed Bellotti by upholding a parental consent statute
under the new “undue burden” standard. This standard invalidates
any statutory provision governing the right to abortion when it “has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”50 In that case,
abortion clinics and physicians challenged five different provisions of
the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982; one of which
“require[d] the informed consent of one of [a minor’s] parents, but
provide[d] for a judicial bypass option.”51 Applying the new undue
burden standard,52 the Court upheld all of the challenged provisions
except for the spousal notification provision in the Act.53 In striking
down a spousal notification provision while upholding the parental
consent provision, the Court focused on the possibility of domestic
abuse victims facing life-threatening situations if forced to notify their
spouses, explaining that “the significant number of women who fear
for their safety and the safety of their children are likely to be deterred
from procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had
outlawed abortion in all cases.”54 Thus, the Court opined that, at least
for this group of women, the spousal notification provision—like that
of spousal consent—would function as an absolute veto and place an
undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion.55 However, the Court

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (holding a law prohibiting the instruction
of the German language unconstitutional, in part because of the “right of parents to
engage [teachers] so to instruct their children”). But see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (emphasizing parents’ right to direct the upbringing of their
children, but holding that child labor laws trumped this right, as parental rights are
not absolute).
48. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 644.
49. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
50. See id. at 877, 899 (reaffirming the Bellotti decision by finding that no undue burden
was created by a parental consent statute when there is a judicial bypass option available).
51. Id. at 844.
52. See id. at 879.
53. Id. at 879–901.
54. Id. at 894.
55. See id. at 897 (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 69 (1976)) (finding spousal consent provisions unconstitutional).
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noted that the inclusion of the judicial bypass process appropriately
diminished the veto effect of a parental consent requirement, and thus
explained why parental involvement laws were upheld in the decision,
while spousal notification provisions were simultaneously struck down.56
Though it has been asserted that the framework and reasoning used
in Casey to strike down spousal notification laws could and should be
logically extended to parental involvement laws,57 the Court has yet to
do so.58 Instead, the only clear constitutional guideposts in place for
the judicial bypass process are the vague “maturity” and “best interests”
standards set out in Bellotti.59 This leaves states plenty of room to
expand or restrict minors’ rights within the general framework of these
proceedings—which results in the imposition of seemingly small
hurdles that add up and make the process of judicial bypass extremely
burdensome for many young women.60
56. See id. at 899. But see Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 473 (1990)
(Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting
in part) (arguing that “a judicial bypass procedure . . . is itself unconstitutional because
it effectively gives a judge an absolute veto over the decision of the physician and his
patient” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
57. See generally Alexandra Rex, Note, Protecting the One Percent: Relevant Women,
Undue Burdens, and Unworkable Judicial Bypasses, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 85, 108–18 (2014)
(applying the Casey spousal notification analysis to parental involvement laws).
58. Id. at 108 n.140 (noting that courts often uphold “Casey look-alike statutes”
despite the questionable purposes and benefits of parental involvement laws).
59. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979); see also Lambert v. Wicklund,
520 U.S. 292, 297–98 (1997) (per curiam) (specifying, as to the “best interests”
standard, that “requiring a minor to show that parental notification is not in her best
interests is equivalent to a judicial bypass procedure requiring a minor to show that
abortion without notification is in her best interests”).
60. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 441–42 (internal quotation marks omitted)) (“[J]udges
who adjudicated over 90% of [the] petitions [in question in that case] testified; none
of them identified any positive effects of the [parental involvement] law. The court
experience produced fear, tension, anxiety, and shame among minors, causing some
who were mature, or some whose best interests would have been served by an abortion,
to forego the bypass option and either notify their parents or carry to term.”); Paul
Danielson, Judicial Recusal and a Minor’s Right to an Abortion, 2 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y
125, 132 (2007) (noting that, in seeking to access the judicial bypass process, “a minor
must take a number of time-consuming steps, including ‘contact[ing] the attorney,
arrang[ing] for transportation to court, and leav[ing] school without having her
parents learn of the situation’” (alterations in original)); Lauren Treadwell, Note,
Informal Closing of the Bypass: Minors’ Petitions to Bypass Parental Consent for Abortion in an
Age of Increasing Judicial Recusals, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 869, 878 (2006) (arguing that the
abundance of judicial recusals for judges assigned to judicial bypass hearings due to
an inability to be impartial on an issue involving abortion triggers the application of
the undue burden standard by presenting obstacles for the minors undergoing
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One practical hurdle for minors going through the judicial bypass
process is the current trend among states with parental involvement
laws to raise the evidentiary standard for minors in judicial bypass
hearings from the common “preponderance of the evidence” standard
to the “clear and convincing evidence” standard.61 Currently, fifteen
states62 require a clear and convincing evidence standard for minors
going through the judicial bypass process.63 Furthermore, only five of
these states also provide specific criteria governing how the judge
evaluates “maturity” or “best interests,”64 leaving minors pursuing

the process); Judicial Bypass Procedures: Undue Burdens for Young People Seeking Safe
Abortion Care, ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH (June 2015), http://www.advocatesforyouth.org/
storage/advfy/documents/Factsheets/judicial%20bypass%20procedures.pdf (highli
ghting logistical obstacles to judicial bypass implemented by various states, including
rules limiting which courts can hold the hearings, longer durations for the process,
allowance of bias-laden judicial questioning of the minor, and provision of legal
representation for the fetus); GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 10 (identifying waiting
periods for minors and requirements of notarized documentation of parental consent
as obstacles for minors seeking to obtain an abortion, even without going through the
judicial bypass process); Redden, supra note 1 (providing anecdotal evidence of a
Florida teen who faced cumulative obstacles in pursuing a waiver of parental consent
through the judicial bypass process).
61. GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 10.
62. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(C) (2014); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16809(c)(1)(A) (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-37.5-107(2)(a) (2003) (repealed 2018);
FLA. STAT. § 390.01114(4)(c) (2011) (amended 2018); IDAHO CODE § 18-609A(2)
(2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(d) (2014); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.14(B)(4)(b)
(2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55(4) (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1(2)
(2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-6903(2) (2011) (amended 2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.85(C)(1) (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-740.3(A) (2013); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 34-23A-7(1) (2017); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(i) (West 2016); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 35-6-118(v)(B) (1997).
63. Many states with heightened evidentiary standards for judicial bypass hearings
also have highly deferential appellate standards of review (i.e. “clearly erroneous” or
“abuse of discretion”) for appellate courts reviewing the decisions from these hearings.
See Placey, supra note 16, at 732–40. This presents even greater concern, given that a
denial of judicial bypass under a heightened evidentiary standard will also often go
unchecked by the appellate process. See id. at 707 (“A survey of published judicial
bypass appellate opinions reveals that varied judgments result from similar facts, even
in a single state.”).
64. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 390.01114(4)(c) (instructing the courts to consider the
pregnant minor’s age, intelligence, “[e]motional development and stability,”
“[c]redibility and demeanor as a witness,” “[a]bility to accept responsibility,” “[a]bility
to assess both the immediate and long-range consequences of the minor’s choices,”
and “[a]bility to understand and explain the medical risks of terminating her
pregnancy and to apply that understanding to her decision”); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT.
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judicial bypass in the other nine states subject not only to a heightened
evidentiary standard, but also blind to specific pleading requirements.65
The imposition of this heightened standard tends to be motivated by
“a sense in these states that girls ‘have it easy’ going into a bypass
hearing.”66 However, before engaging in an in-depth discussion on the
permissibility of the use of this standard in judicial bypass proceedings,
it is helpful to first gain an understanding of its general origins and its
alleged purpose in the judicial bypass context.
B. Purpose and Function of the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard
The clear and convincing evidence standard of proof is the highest
evidentiary standard employed in civil proceedings, second only to the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard employed in criminal proceedings.67
In general, standards of proof function to “instruct the factfinder
concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have
in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of
adjudication.”68 Within the range of standards, clear and convincing
evidence is situated to “protect particularly important individual interests
in various civil cases” that involve more than “mere loss of money.”69
Though the meaning of “clear and convincing” varies by state, one can
generally articulate the standard as “persuad[ing] the [factfinder] that
the proposition is highly probable, or . . . produc[ing] in the mind of
the factfinder a firm belief or conviction that the allegations in
question are true.”70 Thus, the typical evidentiary standard is
preponderance of the evidence, and the clear and convincing evidence
standard tends to be employed where a party—usually a defendant in a
proceeding initiated by the government—is at risk of having a significant
ANN. § 36-2152(C); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-801(d)(2); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(n);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(i-1).
65. Compare, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 390.01114(4)(c) (listing multiple factors that courts
must consider to determine a minor’s “maturity” and “best interests”), with MISS. CODE
ANN. § 41-41-55(4) (listing the Bellotti “maturity” and “best interests” factors without
any additional explanation).
66. Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse
of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 432 (2009); see infra notes 75–76 and
accompanying text (examining judicial bypass structure).
67. See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 173 (2017) (examining the various evidentiary
standards of proof).
68. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
69. Id. at 424 (defining intermediate evidentiary standards).
70. 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 173.
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liberty interest erroneously taken away.71 This is justified by the principle
that “[t]he individual should not be asked to share equally with society
the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly
greater than any possible harm to the state,” as he or she would
presumably be required to do if the applicable standard of proof was
preponderance of the evidence.72 For example, in Addington v. Texas,73
the Court determined that an individual’s interest in avoiding civil
commitment is so weighty that the government must justify commitment
by clear and convincing evidence to comport with due process.74
Employing the clear and convincing evidence standard in judicial
bypass proceedings has been justified in various ways. For instance, the
“magnitude of the decision at issue” has been used to justify a
heightened evidentiary standard.75 Furthermore, the state and parental
interests in the outcome of the proceeding provide courts with further
support for ruling in favor of the heightened evidentiary standard.76
71. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768, 791 (1982) (upholding the
application of the clear and convincing evidence standard to parental termination
proceedings, reasoning that, “at a parental rights termination proceeding, a nearequal allocation of risk [of interest deprivation] between the parents and the State is
constitutionally intolerable”); Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 (requiring clear and
convincing evidence in civil commitment proceedings); Nowak v. United States, 356
U.S. 660, 663 (1958) (requiring that the government prove the defendant’s noncitizen status in a denaturalization proceeding by “clear, unequivocal, and convincing”
evidence so as “not [to] leave the ‘issue in doubt’”) (citation omitted).
72. Addington, 441 U.S. at 427.
73. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
74. Id. at 427.
75. See In re Petition of Anonymous 1, 558 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Neb. 1997) (per
curiam) (considering the magnitude of the decision, the ex parte structure of the
proceedings, and the relative ease of proving requirements under the preponderance
of the evidence standard to justify the imposition of the clear and convincing evidence
standard on minors going through the judicial bypass process).
76. See In re B.S., 74 P.3d 285, 289–90 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that
application of the clear and convincing standard is permissible to prevent the bypass
process from becoming “a mere pass-through proceeding,” “to maximize the court’s
ability to make a reasoned decision,” and to take into account the impact of the process
on parental decision making rights); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979)
(“[I]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations that
state can neither supply nor hinder.” (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944))). But see Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. Alaska, 375 P.3d 1122, 1164
(Alaska 2016) (ruling that a parental involvement statute requiring a clear and
convincing evidence standard in judicial bypass proceedings was not narrowly tailored
to serve the state’s interests in “protecting minors from their own immaturity” and
“aiding parents to fulfill their parental responsibilities”).
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Thus, the judicial bypass proceeding implicates a complex web of
rights and interests and puts the minor at the center of the process in
a tricky position, given that the minor is “the party asserting the
affirmative of an issue,” and thus bears the burden of proof,77 but is
also the party attempting to protect a constitutionally-afforded,
fundamental liberty interest.78 This structure is, therefore, unique in
that the clear and convincing evidence standard is not imposed in this
context to protect the defendant from government intrusion on a
liberty interest.79 Indeed, there is no defendant, and the principal
party with a competing interest—generally the parents—are not
actively asserting their rights by virtue of the proceeding’s purpose and
structure.80 This, in turn, makes the weighing of interests and
application of the undue burden standard all the more complicated.
Furthermore, while recent developments in the evolution of the undue
burden standard have not specifically referenced its application to
judicial bypass proceedings, they do provide a stronger framework for
analyzing the impact of heightened evidentiary standards, coupled
with the state interests espoused in the process of imposing these
standards. However, as of now, the ultimate rule of law is that these
heightened standards are constitutional.81
C. Using a Heightened Evidentiary Standard Under
Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health
While heightened evidentiary standards present significant
challenges for minors who still bear the ultimate burden of proving
“maturity” or “best interests,”82 the Supreme Court has held that the

77. Anonymous 1, 558 N.W.2d at 787; see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
78. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 90 (1976) (Stewart,
J., concurring) (asserting that a statute’s “imposition of an absolute limitation on the
minor’s right to obtain an abortion” renders the statute unconstitutional); see also Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (situating the right to abortion within the fundamental
substantive due process right to privacy); supra note 8 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 71 and accompanying text; see also Wendy-Adele Humphrey, TwoStepping Around a Minor’s Constitutional Right to Abortion, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1769, 1794
n.165 (2017) (“The Texas Family Code uses clear and convincing evidence in a number of
other circumstances, but the burden is generally used only when the state is attempting to
take away a constitutional right . . . . Thus, arguably, the heightened burden should not be
used as an additional hurdle for a young woman to exercise a constitutional right she
already has: the right to choose when and whether to become a parent.”).
80. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
81. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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use of these standards is constitutional where the hearing is conducted
ex parte.83 In Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Slaby,84 the Sixth
Circuit applied a procedural due process analysis and ruled that use of
the clear and convincing evidence standard in judicial bypass
proceedings was unconstitutional.85 Specifically, the court illuminated
the procedural deficiencies in requiring a heightened standard of
proof for minors, given the liberty interest at stake, by stating that:
[i]n considering whether the standard of proof utilized in a given
proceeding complies with due process, a court must consider three
factors: “the private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of
error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and the countervailing
government interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.”86

By engaging in this analysis, the court used the Mathews v. Eldridge87
framework, where the risk of erroneous deprivation of a protected
liberty interest is weighed against the state interest in using the
particular procedural device.88 The court ultimately found that the
clear and convincing evidence standard presented too great a risk of
erroneous deprivation of the minor’s protected liberty interest in
obtaining an abortion.89 Notably, this decision occurred before the
undue burden standard existed, thus explaining the reliance on a
procedural due process approach.
However, on appeal in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, the
Supreme Court overturned the Sixth Circuit’s decision, relying heavily
on the provision of a non-adversarial setting for the judicial bypass
hearing—an ex parte hearing—as well as the assistance of counsel as
83. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 516 (1990) (stating
that the state may require a clear and convincing evidence standard where the hearing
is ex parte and finding the provision of a court-appointed guardian ad litem to be
persuasive in favor of the permissiveness of heightened standards). But see Elizabeth
Susan Graybill, Note, Assisting Minors Seeking Abortions in Judicial Bypass Proceedings: A
Guardian Ad Litem is No Substitute for an Attorney, 55 VAND. L. REV. 581, 586 (2002)
(noting that “it is possible that the guardian ad litem will subvert the minor’s expressed
interest in seeking a judicial waiver of parental involvement by advocating . . . that an
abortion is not in the minor’s best interests”).
84. 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1988), rev’d sub nom. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502.
85. Slaby, 854 F.2d at 864.
86. Id. at 863 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982)).
87. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
88. See id. at 342 (finding that certain administrative procedures created too great
a risk of erroneous deprivation in the form of social security benefits termination,
which the Court considered to be a particularly weighty property interest because
public benefits are life-sustaining for those who rely on them).
89. Slaby, 854 F.2d at 863.
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lessening the burden placed on the minor, despite the statutory
burden of proof still ultimately resting on her shoulders.90 Thus, the
Court declined to follow the Sixth Circuit’s procedural due process
analysis,91 instead relying on what it considered to be ample procedural
safeguards—chiefly, assistance of counsel and an ex parte hearing
structure.92 The issue of heightened evidentiary standards in judicial
bypass hearings, however, still presents a unique intersection of
challenges involving both substantive and procedural due process
implications.
D. The Strengthened Undue Burden Standard Under
Whole Woman’s Health
While the Court in Casey defined an undue burden as any provision
that “has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion,”93 the Court recently gave teeth
to this standard in Whole Woman’s Health.94 In the case, the Court
analyzed the effects of Texas’s Targeted Regulations of Abortion
Providers (TRAP laws)95 on women’s access to abortion in the state.
The Court engaged in two types of analyses in unprecedented depth:
(1) examination of extensive data regarding the effect of the laws on
women’s actual access to clinics and abortion care, and (2) consideration
of whether the asserted purpose of the regulations matched up with a
demonstrated need for those measures.96
90. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 516 (1990).
91. See id. at 519–20.
92. See id. at 517.
93. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (explaining
that a state provision is invalidated when it creates an undue burden).
94. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
95. So-called “TRAP laws” encompass laws that “single out the medical practices of
doctors who provide abortions and impose on them requirements that are different
and more burdensome than those imposed on other medical practices.” Targeted Regulation
of Abortion Providers (TRAP), CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.
reproductiverights.org/project/targeted-regulation-of-abortion-providers-trap. These
regulations include certain facility standards (most notably, ambulatory surgical center
requirements), required relationships with hospitals (for example, physicians
performing abortions have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital), and onerous
licensing standards. See State Laws and Policies: Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers,
GUTTMACHER INST. (June 1, 2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/
targeted-regulation-abortion-providers.
96. The Court “conclude[ed] that neither of the provisions confer[red] medical
benefits sufficient to justify the burdens upon access that each impose[d].” Whole
Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300. In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered
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In enacting the TRAP laws, Texas imposed onerous regulations on
abortion providers, which were not required for other similarly
situated medical providers, all supposedly in the name of protecting
women’s health.97 These laws represent one of many regulation
strategies across the United States put in place to chip away at abortion
access.98 However, in analyzing the health benefits of these regulations—
or lack thereof—the Court abandoned the deference accorded to
legislative findings in the prior case of Gonzales v. Carhart,99 noting that
the statute at issue failed to include any legislative findings, so the
Court was “left to infer that the legislature sought to further a
constitutionally acceptable objective.”100 In its conclusion, the Court
placed great emphasis on the legislature producing concrete data on
the remedial nature of regulations if claiming they were passed for a
women’s health-protective purpose.101

data on clinic closures resulting from Texas’s admitting privileges requirement, id. at
2312, and the same with respect to Texas’s surgical center requirements, id. at 2315–
16. See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole Woman Makes:
Protection for the Abortion Right After Whole Woman’s Health, 126 YALE L.J.F. 149, 150
(2016) (suggesting that Whole Woman’s Health unexpectedly broadened the protections
for the abortion right by giving “close attention to scientific evidence about the health
benefits of regulating abortion,” which “call[ed] into question myriad healthjustified . . . [and] fetal-protective restrictions on abortion”).
97. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 96, at 151.
98. See Olga Khazan, Planning the End of Abortion, THE ATLANTIC (July 16, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/what-pro-life-activists-reallywant/398297 (discussing how state legislators partner with pro-life groups to pass
potentially unconstitutional abortion restrictions with the goal of testing the undue
burden standard and the Supreme Court’s protection of abortion rights).
99. 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007).
100. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310 (emphasizing that “in Gonzales[,] the
Court, while pointing out that we must review legislative ‘fact-finding under a
deferential standard,’ added that we must not ‘place dispositive weight’ on those
‘findings’” (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 165)); see also Meghan Harper, Comment,
Making Sense of Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt: The Development of a New Approach
to the Undue Burden Standard, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 757, 777 (2017) (“Instead of giving a
high deference to the stated legislative rationale behind an abortion regulation, the
balancing test appropriately replaces this deference with the requirement to examine
hard evidence and statistics to consider whether a legitimate state interest is necessarily
reached through a regulation or whether the state interest can be attained without
harming a woman’s right to abortion in the process.”).
101. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–10 (explaining that the Court
places “considerable weight upon evidence and argument presented in judicial
proceedings” when it is tasked with determining the constitutionality of laws regulating
abortion procedures).
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First, in its decision, the Court used “evidence-based balancing” of
the benefits along with the burdens created by the abortion regulations
and “assesse[d] the impact of . . . abortion restriction[s] in
constitutional terms sensitive to women’s experience in making and
carrying out a decision to end a pregnancy.”102 Thus, Whole Woman’s
Health expanded the scope of Casey, making more room within the
undue burden standard for consideration of practical barriers to
accessing the right to abortion.103 Second, the Court questioned, and
ultimately found insufficient, the state’s asserted women’s healthprotective purpose of the laws.104 The Court noted that, while protecting
women’s health is a legitimate state interest, the state must advance
some “evidence that shows that, compared to prior law, . . . the new law
advance[s] [the state’s] legitimate interest in protecting women’s
health.”105 As a result, going forward, courts must utilize evidence-based
balancing in applying the undue burden test to abortion restrictions by:
(1) examining the record to determine the practical impact the
restriction has on women’s paths to abortion, and (2) considering
whether the asserted purpose of the statute is actually supported by a
demonstrated need for the regulations.106 This requirement strengthens
the impact of the Casey undue burden standard by making the standard
more formidable for proponents of statutes that restrict abortion
access. Furthermore, the Court only applied this new test to TRAP

102. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 96, at 162; see, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S.
Ct. at 2318 (using evidence of long travel times and distances, as well as overcrowding of
clinics, to demonstrate the undue burden created by the TRAP laws).
103. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (“We conclude that neither of these
provisions confers medical benefits sufficient to justify the burdens upon access that
each imposes. Each places a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a
previability abortion . . . .”); Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 96, at 162 (“The Court
considers restrictions cumulatively and in context, describing how, taken as a whole,
they will alter the lived conditions of exercising the abortion right.”).
104. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 96, at 158 (“While the majority never
explicitly states that Texas enacted the admitting privileges and surgical center
requirements with a purpose to obstruct women’s access to abortion, the Court’s deep
skepticism of the state’s actual motivation shines through the opinion.”); see also Whole
Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2315 (comparing Texas’s regulation of abortion with that
of other medical procedures, which pose greater risk to women’s health, and finding
the singling out of abortion facilities and providers arbitrary at best and targeted at
worst); id. at 2320 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“Many medical procedures, including
childbirth, are far more dangerous to patients [than abortion], yet are not subject to
ambulatory-surgical-center or hospital admitting-privileges requirements.”).
105. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2311.
106. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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laws, but did not use limiting language to reach its decision, which
suggests that courts could apply the test in different contexts in the
future.107 Since the issuance of the Whole Woman’s Health decision,
courts have applied the strengthened undue burden standard by
comparing the practical effects created by a given regulation, and
engaging in deeper analyses regarding the impact on abortion access
for the women who are most affected by the regulations.108 Going
forward, the decision presents wide-ranging implications for many
types of abortion regulations other than purely medical or healthrelated restrictions,109 including those involving minors and judicial
bypass.110 Specifically, a heightened evidentiary standard for minors
undergoing the judicial bypass process amounts to an undue burden
under this strengthened standard set out in Whole Woman’s Health. This
makes the imposition of the clear and convincing evidence standard
unconstitutional and negates the Court’s approval of heightened
evidentiary standards in the ex parte judicial bypass proceedings in
Akron Center for Reproductive Health.

107. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (concluding that the provisions at
issue in the case did not “confer[] medical benefits sufficient to justify the burdens
upon access” that they created and that they “place[] a substantial obstacle in the path
of women seeking a previability abortion”).
108. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. v. Jegley, 864 F.3d 953, 959
(8th Cir. 2017) (applying the Whole Woman’s Health analysis to a regulation involving
medication abortion facilities by comparing the level of restriction on access to
facilities created by the regulation to the similar considerations in Whole Woman’s
Health, and speculating as to the number of women most affected by the regulations
that would forgo abortions as a result); W. Ala. Women’s Ctr. v. Miller, 299 F. Supp. 3d
1244, 1254–55 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (engaging in the Whole Woman’s Health requirement
of demonstrated need for the regulation based on legislative findings by determining
that, absent legislative findings, a “school-proximity law would impose a substantial
obstacle . . . [because] the State’s asserted interests are only minimally, if at all,
furthered by the law, while the burden imposed on a woman’s right to obtain an
abortion is substantial”); see also id. at 1252 (remarking that “[t]he undue-burden test
requires courts to examine ‘the [challenged] regulation in its real-world context’”) (quoting
Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 9 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1287 (M.D. Ala. 2014)).
109. See, e.g., Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 96, at 160–61 (arguing that the
Court’s emphasis on production of legislative findings to justify burdensome abortion
restrictions could and should also apply to fetal-protective laws).
110. See id. at 150.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. Requiring Clear and Convincing Evidence is an Undue Burden
Under Whole Woman’s Health
Use of the clear and convincing evidence standard in judicial bypass
proceedings constitutes an undue burden under the strengthened test
set out in Whole Woman’s Health. This Section will apply the two
considerations mandated by the Whole Woman’s Health ruling to assert
that the use of heightened evidentiary standards in judicial bypass
proceedings are unconstitutional.111 This Section will also argue that,
in light of this assertion, the unconstitutionality of heightened
evidentiary standards in judicial bypass proceedings negates the
Court’s ruling on the issue in Akron Center for Reproductive Health.112 At
the core of the legal and political debate over restrictions placed on
minors’ right to abortion is the tension between the legitimate interest
of the state in protecting parents’ rights to raise their children and to
be active participants in their children’s decision making,113 and the
minor’s right to abortion.114 Though fetal protection remains part of
the state interest in regulation of abortion for both adult women and
minors, specifically in regulating abortions for minors, there are two
additional state interests that are commonly espoused to justify the
imposition of parental involvement laws and, thus, regulations of the
judicial bypass process. These justifications or state interests are:
(1) protecting minors from their own immaturity, and (2) preserving
parental rights and family cohesion.115 The Whole Woman’s Health undue
burden framework must be applied to the clear and convincing
evidence standard in judicial bypass proceedings with respect to both of
these legitimate state interests. Thus, this Section will apply the two
prongs of the Whole Woman’s Health analysis to the imposition of the
clear and convincing evidence standard in light of the two rationales
advanced in favor of this standard by: (1) evaluating to what extent
the imposition of the clear and convincing evidence standard poses
111. See infra Section II.A.
112. See infra Section II.B.
113. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
114. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976)
(holding that a parent cannot possess an absolute veto over a minor’s right to abortion
because “[a]ny independent interest the parent may have in the termination of the
minor daughter’s pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the
competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant”).
115. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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practical barriers to minors’ abortion access, and (2) examining each
rationale for the clear and convincing evidence standard—protecting
minors from their own immaturity and preserving parental rights—in
light of the Court’s insistence on a demonstrated need for the abortion
regulations based on legislative findings.
1.

The clear and convincing evidence standard creates practical barriers to
minors’ access to abortion care.
The Whole Woman’s Health decision requires first that a “practical
barriers” consideration be applied to the abortion regulation at issue—
that is, whether and to what extent the regulation creates practical
barriers for minors seeking to access their right to abortion.116 The
Court in Akron Center for Reproductive Health justified the constitutionality
of heightened burdens of proof in judicial bypass proceedings
principally by pointing to the ex parte structure of the proceedings,
which it considered a significant procedural safeguard.117 However, this
factor fails to counteract the practical barriers that minors encounter—
created by the heightened clear and convincing evidence standard—
when seeking a judicial waiver that grants access to abortion services.
Specifically, the heightened standard gives judges more leeway to deny
petitions for parental consent waivers based on arbitrary determinations,
such as the minor’s “demeanor,”118 “composure, analytic ability, appearance,
thoughtfulness, tone of voice, expressions, and her ability to articulate
her reasoning and conclusions.”119 Furthermore, in states where
appellate standards of review are highly deferential, decisions based on
these determinations may go virtually unchecked by appellate courts.120
116. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
117. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 516 (1990).
118. In re Doe, 67 So. 3d 268, 268–69 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“Significantly, the
trial court made specific findings and expressed particular concern regarding the
minor’s demeanor.”).
119. Ex parte Anonymous, 806 So. 2d 1269, 1274 (Ala. 2001) (listing various factors
from which a trial judge may “draw inferences”).
120. See Sanger, supra note 66, at 420, 433 (noting that, while the judicial bypass
process is non-adversarial, “[s]ome judges have included moral verdicts within their
assessment of the minor’s maturity” or “examined petitioners in a prosecutorial
manner”); Redden, supra note 1 (reporting on the outcomes of forty judicial bypass
cases from Florida in which “judges denied minors’ petitions for arbitrary, absurd, or
personal reasons—such as a minor’s failure to discuss her decision with a priest”); see
also SILVERSTEIN, supra note 41, at 177 (comparing the implementation of Supreme
Court decisions on judicial bypass to implementation of the ruling in Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and arguing that, while the judicial bypass structure was put
in place to balance competing interests, in reality judges bring politics into the process).
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For example, in In re Anonymous 5,121 the Nebraska Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court’s determination of a lack of sufficient maturity,
despite the minor having proffered evidence of her fear that her foster
home placement would be put in jeopardy; her participation in
multiple sessions of abortion counseling, including multiple
ultrasounds; her understanding of the potential consequences of
abortion; and her college plans.122 Additionally, the court in that case
accorded deference to the trial court’s determination that the sixteenyear-old minor petitioner was not mature, in part, because she was “not
self-sufficient, and [was] dependent upon her foster parents.”123 In
Florida, a court of appeals upheld a denial of a parental consent waiver,
in which the trial judge had included his own moral convictions as a
Catholic within the hearing, and actively discouraged the minor from
seeking the abortion.124 In a more recent case, a Texas court of appeals
affirmed a trial court’s determination that the minor petitioner was not
sufficiently aware “of the emotional and psychological aspects of
undergoing an abortion,” because she testified that she had read a
booklet produced by the Department of Health detailing the
psychological consequences of abortion, but could not adequately
expound on the knowledge she obtained by reading the booklet.125
Additionally, some courts have denied waiver petitions, despite a
finding of parental abuse in the minor’s home, potentially making the
situation for an already vulnerable minor even worse by mandating
that she carry her pregnancy to term.126

121. 838 N.W.2d 226 (Neb. 2013) (per curiam).
122. See id. at 234–35; see also In re Jane Doe 1, 566 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (Ohio 1991)
(upholding a trial court determination of lack of maturity, despite a doctor having
testified to the minor’s sufficient knowledge and understanding of the abortion
procedure, in addition to allegations of parental abuse and demonstrated college plans).
123. Anonymous 5, 838 N.W.2d at 231.
124. See In re Doe, 973 So. 2d 548, 554, 564–66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (Kelly, J.,
concurring) (affirming the denial of parental consent waiver, despite the trial judge
telling the petitioning minor to consider how distressed her Catholic parents would
be if they discovered that she had obtained an abortion, and referencing his own
Catholicism in the process).
125. See In re Doe, 501 S.W.3d 313, 320–24 (Tex. App. 2016). Notably, the Texas
legislature recently adopted the clear and convincing evidence standard in 2015, and
has a highly deferential “abuse of discretion” appellate standard of review for judicial
bypass cases. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(i) (West 2016); Placey, supra note 16, at
739 (listing Texas as requiring an “abuse of discretion” appellate standard of review).
126. See, e.g., Redden, supra note 1 (highlighting the statements of an Alabama
judge who denied a waiver petition, despite the fact that the minor’s father, who
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Thus, while the heightened evidentiary standard has been advanced
for the purpose of requiring judges to take more care in deciding these
cases,127 the practical result is that judges have significantly more room
to consider potentially arbitrary, insignificant, or inappropriate factors,
especially where there is a highly deferential appellate standard of
review in place.128 Moreover, oftentimes the asserted purpose of the
heightened evidentiary standard with regard to judicial determinations
seems to indicate that they are actually put in place simply to make the
process harder for the minor petitioner.129 This makes the ex parte
structure of the judicial bypass hearing an ineffective safeguard against
the unduly burdensome nature of the heightened evidentiary
standard, given that some judges act as a pseudo-adversary in these
proceedings. In reality, a minor’s ability to successfully obtain a waiver
of parental consent through the judicial bypass process may be entirely
dependent on the judge assigned to her case.130 Additionally, when a
higher evidentiary standard is coupled with a lack of specific criteria
accessible to minor petitioners in advance of the hearing, the barrier
to a minor’s access to abortion is even more difficult to overcome.131
When combined with the myriad other obstacles within the judicial
bypass process,132 the heightened clear and convincing evidence
physically abused his children, “had told [the minor] that if she ever came home
pregnant he would kill her”).
127. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 517–18 (1990) (finding
that the clear and convincing evidence standard “does not place an unconstitutional
burden” on the minor, but rather safeguards due process).
128. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (highlighting judges who have
weighed factors such as the minor’s failure to consult a priest).
129. See, e.g., In re B.S., 74 P.3d 285, 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that
application of the clear and convincing evidence standard is permissible “to avoid
making a judicial bypass a mere pass-through proceeding, and to maximize the court’s
ability to make a reasoned decision”).
130. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 41, at 170–71 (highlighting the particular difficulty
with judges in the so-called “Bible Belt” who harbor specific cultural and religious
inclinations that make them anti-abortion); Redden, supra note 1 (alteration in
original) (providing commentary from a judicial bypass scholar in which she stated,
“[I]n practice, girls are at the mercy of whichever judge they happen to draw . . . . ‘If
a girl wanders into the wrong [court], she doesn’t have a chance’”).
131. See, e.g., supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text; GUTTMACHER INST., supra
note 10 (noting that only seven states require and publish specific criteria for judges
to consider in judicial bypass hearings).
132. See, e.g., supra note 60; see also Marlow Svatek, Seeing the Forest for the Trees: Why
Courts Should Consider Cumulative Effects in the Undue Burden Analysis, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 121, 132 (2017) (arguing that an undue burden analysis should
consider the effects of abortion restrictions in the aggregate); cf. Whole Woman’s
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standard fails to pass constitutional muster under the first prong in
Whole Woman’s Health;133 considering the burdens of the standard in
terms of practical barriers to minors’ abortion access, along with the
benefits it confers, it constitutes an undue burden on a minor’s right
to abortion.
2. There is no evidence based on legislative findings that the asserted purpose
of imposing the heightened standard matches up with a demonstrated need
for this measure.
The second prong of the Whole Woman’s Health undue burden
framework dictates that the state’s asserted purpose of the abortion
restrictions must be supported by legislative findings sufficient to show
a demonstrated need for the regulations.134 However, there is no
effective evidence showing that there is a need for the clear and
convincing evidence standard based either on the interest in
protecting minors from their own immaturity or the interest in
protecting parental rights. Therefore, after Whole Woman’s Health, a
state legislature imposing the clear and convincing evidence standard
in judicial bypass proceedings must supply findings that support a need
for this restriction based on the asserted interests.
In Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest v. Alaska,135 the Supreme
Court of Alaska refused to buy into the legislature’s asserted purposes
for a heightened evidentiary standard in judicial bypass proceedings,
one of which was “protecting minors from their own immaturity.”136
While it is not always phrased in that particular way, this seems to be
one of the driving forces behind abortion restrictions on minors,

Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2313 (2016) (emphasizing the cumulative burdens
the state’s TRAP laws placed on women seeking to obtain an abortion).
133. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (“The rule announced in Casey . . .
requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together
with the benefits those laws confer.”).
134. See id. at 2309–10 (stressing that the Court does not place dispositive weight on
legislative findings, but rather maintains their constitutional duty to review Congress’
findings); id. at 2313 (observing the “virtual absence of any health benefit” produced
by the Texas law); Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 96, at 157–58 (“[E]xamining the
evidence about the law’s impact[,] . . . Justice Breyer concludes that the law was at
cross-purposes with its stated ends . . . This evidence-based balancing of the law’s
benefits and burdens calls into question Texas’ very purpose in enacting the state’s
health-justified restrictions on abortion.”).
135. 375 P.3d 1122 (Alaska 2016).
136. Id. at 1139, 1143 (concluding that the state’s asserted interests were insufficient
justification for the parental notification statute).
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originating from the “maturity” standard established in Bellotti.137
However, there is no sufficient evidence that a heightened evidentiary
standard would have a protective effect on minors who want to obtain
an abortion to the extent that it outweighs the burden created by making
a waiver of parental consent significantly more difficult to obtain.
For example, because states tend to impose the clear and convincing
evidence standard based on assumptions that the bypass process is not
rigorous enough138 or might become a “mere pass-through” proceeding,139
the ruling in Whole Woman’s Health dictates that the states asserting this
rationale would need to show that the process was actually functioning as
a “mere pass-through” without the heightened evidentiary standard in
place.140 Moreover, the harm of a minor being forced to carry her
pregnancy to term is much greater than the risk of the minor being
able to obtain an abortion when it may have been an immature
decision.141 When comparing the abortion decision in this context to other
bodily decisions, the distinction becomes clear. For example:
[t]he pregnant minor’s options are much different from those facing
a minor in other situations, such as decision whether to marry. A
minor not permitted to marry before the age of majority is required
simply to postpone her decision . . . . A pregnant adolescent, however,
cannot preserve for long the possibility of aborting, which effectively
expires in a matter of weeks from the onset of pregnancy.142
137. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979); see also Planned Parenthood of Cent.
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 102 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (arguing that parental involvement laws help protect minors “from the
consequences of an incorrect decision”); EHRLICH, supra note 4, at 43 (characterizing
the dissent in Danforth as viewing “parental involvement as a necessary prerequisite to
the exercise of the [abortion] right, since a young woman may otherwise mistakenly
believe that abortion was the best choice for her”).
138. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the
misconception that girls “have it easy” going into bypass hearings has given rise to an
unfairly heightened standard).
139. In re B.S., 74 P.3d 285, 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
140. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 132 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10.
141. See Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“Giving birth to an
unwanted child involves an irretrievable change in position for a minor . . . .”); see also
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 475 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (highlighting the circular
logic of the “maturity” standard, in that it forces immature minors to carry their
pregnancies to term and potentially raise a child, despite their judicially determined
immaturity with regard to their own health decisions); supra note 134 and
accompanying text.
142. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642; see also EHRLICH, supra note 4, at 44 (comparing
abortion to body piercing, for which “a 16-year-old . . . simply needs to wait two years
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Thus, the irreversible nature of the harm that occurs if a waiver is
erroneously denied supports the conclusion that heightening the
minor petitioner’s burden of proof not only fails to protect her against
her own immaturity, but actually makes it more likely that she will be
saddled with an irreversible harm.
As previously mentioned, the protection of parental rights is the
second and probably most significant state interest driving states to
differentiate between the way they regulate abortion access for adult
women versus minors.143 States enact procedural restrictions on the
judicial bypass process, including the clear and convincing evidence
standard, in part to support the role of parents in their children’s
decision making and encourage family cohesion.144 This is a valid
purpose, given the invaluable guidance and protection parents can
provide to their children, and the general presumption that parents
will act in the their children’s best interest.145 However, there is no
evidence indicating that a heightened evidentiary standard is necessary
to serve this legitimate state interest, but rather there is evidence that
making judicial bypass harder tends to hurt the most vulnerable
minors, many with already unstable familial relationships.146 Thus, an
analysis similar to that of the Court in Casey—with regard to spousal
notification—can be applied here.147
until she can self-consent to the procedure,” to demonstrate the comparatively “grave
and indelible” consequences of not being able to consent to an abortion at the same
age (quoting Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642)).
143. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing parents’ interest in
directing the upbringing of their children in the abortion context).
144. See generally SILVERSTEIN, supra note 41, at 8–10 (asserting that procedural
restrictions that encourage parental involvement can mitigate the negative psychological
consequences minors may suffer from obtaining an abortion).
145. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2000) (highlighting the “traditional
presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child”);
SILVERSTEIN, supra note 41, at 5–10 (noting that parents can provide support for a
minor’s physical health and safety, as well as her emotional health and well-being
during the process of making the abortion decision or obtaining an abortion).
146. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2320 (2016)
(specifying that the “relevant denominator,” or group of women who should be
considered when a given abortion regulation is challenged, is “those [women] for
whom [the provision] is an actual rather than an irrelevant restriction” (alteration in
original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992)));
Rex, supra note 57, at 89 (arguing that parental involvement laws, despite judicial
bypass, create an undue burden on “affected minors,” meaning the minors for whom
the laws are directly relevant).
147. See Rex, supra note 57, at 108–18 (applying the Casey spousal notification
analysis to parental involvement laws).
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First, most minors consult their parents before seeking an abortion,
despite the presence of a judicial bypass option.148 However, thirty
percent of teens who do not consult their parents refrained from doing
so because they “feared violence or being forced to leave home,” and
many others fall through the cracks due to unstable familial
relationships.149 Indeed, the danger that can come from minors being
forced to notify or obtain consent from their parents is analogous to
the points asserted in Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in Whole Woman’s
Health; that making the judicial bypass a more formidable barrier—
parental notice or consent, and ultimately childbirth—may actually be
more harmful to minors than the alternative.150 Furthermore, studies
show that parental involvement laws disproportionately impact young
women of minority races for various reasons, including higher rates of
teen pregnancy, greater likelihood of living in states with parental
involvement laws, language barriers, and disproportionate low-income
status.151 Therefore, by making it harder to obtain a waiver of parental
148. ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH, supra note 10.
149. Id.; see also EHRLICH, supra note 4, at 114–30 (outlining the various, diverse
reasons a minor may elect not to consult her parents, including fear of “neglect,
pressure, and anger,” “anticipated severe adverse parental reaction or parental anger,”
“concern for the [parent-child] relationship,” “concern for a parent,” “lack of
relationship,” “parental pressure and ideology,” and “[desire for] autonomy”); Rachel
Rebouché, Parental Involvement Laws and New Governance, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 175,
194–95 (2011) (identifying minors in state or foster care as a population particularly
vulnerable to the defects in judicial bypass proceedings, and asserting that parents’
failure to comply with consent requirements might reflect their opposition to abortion
or “may also relate to a parent’s work schedule, immigration status, or temporary
absence due to travel or incarceration”); Redden, supra note 1 (“Susan Hays, a Texas
attorney who represents minors . . . says about a third of the girls she works with don’t
have the option of asking their parents for permission—they’re undocumented
immigrants whose parents are not in the country, orphans, or what Hays calls ‘de facto
orphans’: ‘Mom’s dead, Dad’s in prison, they never liked me much anyway.’ . . . Legal
guardians may grant permission for an abortion in most states. But this is no help to
girls who live with family members who never established guardianship.”).
150. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320–21 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(attacking the asserted purpose of the TRAP laws at issue—protecting women’s
health—by pointing out the greater danger imposed on women if forced to carry a
pregnancy to term due to practical barriers to abortion access, based on the relatively
high maternal mortality rate in the United States).
151. ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH, supra note 9 (noting that women of minority races face
higher rates of teen pregnancy and are more likely to live in states with parental
involvement laws); Issue Brief: Latinas and Abortion Access, NAT’L LATINA INST. FOR
REPROD. HEALTH (Jan. 2004), http://latinainstitute.org/sites/default/files/Abortion
IssueBrief.pdf (highlighting that young Latina women are disproportionately
impacted by barriers in judicial bypass proceedings for reasons such as lack of
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consent by imposing a heightened evidentiary standard, the state is not
serving its interest in supporting familial cohesion for the minors who
are disparately impacted by the process.152 While the right of parents
to direct the upbringing of their children maintains an established
place in privacy jurisprudence,153 there is a point at which this interest
is outweighed by the minor’s right to abortion.154 The same standard
that is applied in parental termination hearings, where the parent is
facing deprivation of the weighty interest of complete parental
rights,155 should not also be applied in a context where the most the
parent will be deprived of is the ability to counsel his or her child on
one health decision—especially one that involves a life-altering,
constitutionally protected decision for the minor involved.
The strengthened undue burden standard can be effectively applied
to the imposition of the clear and convincing evidence standard, even
though this procedural barrier may not be supported by concrete data
like the TRAP laws in Whole Woman’s Health.156 Specifically, according

awareness “of the existence of [judicial bypass] procedures,” intimidation “due to
cultural and linguistic barriers,” and Latinas are more likely to be low-income and
uninsured); Kylie Cheung, As Laws Target Minors’ Abortion Rights, These Groups Help
Them Get Access, REWIRE (Sept. 13, 2017), https://rewire.news/article/2017/09/13/
laws-minors-abortion-groups-help (quoting a representative from the National
Network of Abortion Funds as saying: “Young people of color, undocumented youth,
transgender youth, and others are already too often criminalized because of their very
identities. Young people who have been neglected by the systems that are charged
with supporting them are often hesitant to enter the court system”); U.S. Teenage
Pregnancies, Births and Abortions, 2008: National Trends by Age, Race and Ethnicity,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 2012), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/
pdfs/pubs/USTPtrends08.pdf (tabulating data “indicat[ing] that there are still large
and long-standing disparities in [teenage pregnancy, birth, and abortion] rates by race
and ethnicity”).
152. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–94 (1992)
(reasoning that spousal notification laws create an undue burden because of the
potential effect on victims of domestic violence).
153. See supra note 47 (highlighting the long-standing precedent respecting a
parent’s interest in the upbringing of their child).
154. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (“The
obvious fact is that when the wife and husband disagree on [the abortion] decision,
the view of only one of the two marriage partners can prevail. Inasmuch as it is the
woman who physically bears the child and who is more directly and immediately
affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her favor.”).
155. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982) (requiring that allegations
be proven by clear and convincing evidence to justify termination of parental rights).
156. See, e.g., Treadwell, supra note 60, at 878 (applying the undue burden test to
judicial recusals, even though “[j]udicial recusals are likely not the type of ‘regulation’
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to the conclusions in Whole Woman’s Health, state legislatures should be
required to proffer evidence of the need for procedural restrictions
like heightened evidentiary standards either to protect minors from
their own immaturity or to support parental rights and family
cohesion.157 As there is no evidence of this need, and conversely evidence
does exist concerning the negative effects of evidentiary standards on
these interests,158 the imposition of the clear and convincing evidence
standard creates an undue burden on minors’ right to abortion under
the new framework in set out in Whole Woman’s Health.
B. The Unconstitutionality of the Clear and Convincing Evidence
Standard in Judicial Bypass Proceedings Negates the Supreme
Court’s Ruling in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health with Respect to the Permissibility of Heightened
Evidentiary Standards in Judicial Bypass Proceedings
Having established that requiring minors to prove “maturity” or
“best interests” by clear and convincing evidence creates an undue
burden, applying the strengthened undue burden test negates the
Court’s ruling in Akron Center for Reproductive Health with respect to
heightened evidentiary standards. Thus, the procedural due process
reasoning in the lower court decision should be revisited to inform the
new undue burden determination. Given that the clear and convincing
evidence standard is typically used when a defendant faces potential
deprivation of a weighty liberty interest, usually in an action initiated
by the government,159 it simply does not make sense to require a minor
to meet the same standard to assert a protected liberty interest.160 When
Akron Center for Reproductive Health was decided, there was no undue
the Court had in mind when deciding Casey” because they “have the same effect as laws
regulating access to abortion”).
157. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016) (“[T]he
relevant statute here does not set forth any legislative findings. Rather, one is left to infer
that the legislature sought to further a constitutionally acceptable objective . . . .”); see
supra note 134 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 149–150 and accompanying text (highlighting that minors with
undocumented parents or other strained familial relationships may be forced to carry
to term because they could not obtain parental permission).
159. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (comparing the clear and convincing
evidence standard used in parental rights termination cases with the one used for civil
commitment).
160. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (arguing that a parent’s interest
during a parental rights termination case is not comparable to the State’s interest and
should not be held to the same standard); see also supra note 159.
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burden standard in place, much less the strengthened undue burden
standard that now exists under Whole Woman’s Health. Therefore, the
Sixth Circuit’s procedural due process analysis, applied pursuant to the
Mathews framework, would likely no longer be a valid method for
analyzing this issue.161 However, the basic comparison performed in
the Sixth Circuit decision with regard to the competing interests at
stake can help inform the evidence-based balancing test the Court
would be required to engage in if applying the Whole Woman’s Health
undue burden standard to the imposition of the clear and convincing
evidence standard in judicial bypass proceedings.162 In other words,
while not a permissible controlling test, the Mathews framework can
help answer the required question introduced in Casey and
strengthened in Whole Woman’s Health—do the benefits the regulation
confers outweigh the burdens?
When engaging in the undue burden analysis, the Court
“consider[s] the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together
with the benefits those laws confer.”163 Here, the risk of erroneous
deprivation of the fundamental liberty interest of obtaining an
abortion is particularly great given that clear and convincing evidence
is the highest evidentiary standard used in civil proceedings.164
Furthermore, the asserted benefits the heightened standard confers—
protecting minors from their own immaturity and preserving parental
rights—are substantial, but do not outweigh the burdens it imposes on
a minor’s fundamental liberty interest.165 Specifically, while a lower
evidentiary standard would present the risk of the minor being able to
make an “immature” decision, this is outweighed by the risk of
erroneous deprivation of a constitutionally protected right that is
implicated by the use of the heightened clear and convincing evidence
standard.166 Furthermore, while protection of parental involvement in
161. See supra Section I.C.
162. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s
consideration of the benefits and burdens of heightened evidentiary standards in
judicial bypass proceedings as part of its procedural due process analysis); see also supra
note 96 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s extensive analysis into the purpose
and effect of an abortion regulation).
163. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–98 (1992)).
164. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
165. See supra Section II.A (rationalizing that the harm of forcing a minor to carry
a pregnancy to term and raise an unwanted child is greater than the harm imposed by
a judicial bypass).
166. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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minors’ medical decision making is an asserted benefit of a heightened
evidentiary standard, parental rights are not absolute where there is a
weighty interest at issue for the minor.167 Thus, in the judicial bypass
situation, the minor’s constitutionally protected right to abortion
should outweigh a parent’s right to have input or control on one
medical decision for the minor.168
However, if applying the strengthened undue burden test to
heightened evidentiary standards, the Court would have to also
address the heavy reliance on adequate procedural safeguards in Akron
Center for Reproductive Health.169 At first glance, the ex parte structure
of the proceeding, as well as the appointment of a guardian ad litem,170
appear curative of the challenges posed by the clear and convincing
evidence standard placed on the ultimate bearer of the burden of
proof—the minor.171 However, it is not this simple. There are numerous
defects in these safeguards, including issues with provision of a guardian

167. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1978) (applying the “best
interests of the child” standard and holding that an illegitimate father who never
petitioned for legitimation or sought custody of his son did not have the authority to
block an adoption); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (noting that
the Court has upheld legislation protecting the well-being of children, “even when
[those] laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights”);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (finding that parents’ rights to
care, custody, and control over their children are limited and subject to state
intervention or involvement where the children’s well-being is at stake).
168. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (stressing that “it is the woman who
physically bears the child and who is more directly and immediately affected by the
pregnancy,” and therefore her interests should outweigh the interests of others).
169. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (rejecting the Sixth’s Circuit undue
burden analysis and implementing an ex parte hearing and assistance with counsel to
lessen the burden on minors).
170. See Graybill, supra note 83, at 585–86 (explaining that a guardian ad litem is
generally “‘appointed by the court to appear in a lawsuit on behalf of an incompetent
or minor party’” and is generally “not bound by the client’s expressed wishes and is
able to advocate for a result that he or she believes to be in the minor’s best interests”).
171. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 516 (1990)
(emphasizing the ex parte structure and appointment of a guardian ad litem as reasons
for finding the application of the clear and convincing evidence standard in judicial
bypass proceedings constitutional); see also id. at 515–16 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 634 (1979)) (providing that state legislatures may place the burden of proof
in judicial bypass hearings on the petitioning minor).
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ad litem,172 lack of specific pleading requirements,173 and judges’
prosecutorial manner of conducting the ex parte proceeding,174 that
make them insufficient to overcome the substantial burden produced
by the heightened evidentiary standard. More to the point, none of
these “safeguards” matter if the imposition of the heightened standard
does not pass the strengthened undue burden test from Whole Woman’s
Health, which it does not.175
CONCLUSION
In light of the new framework established in Whole Woman’s Health,
the application of the clear and convincing evidence standard to
judicial bypass proceedings places an undue burden on minors’ right
to abortion. This is shown through the examination of the practical
barriers imposed on minors seeking judicial bypass and by the lack of
evidence that heightened evidentiary standards serve the state interests
in protecting minors from their own immaturity or protecting parental
rights. To pass constitutional muster, the state legislatures imposing
this heightened burden would have to proffer findings that show a
need for this more stringent procedural structure to accomplish one
of these interests.
172. See Graybill, supra note 83, at 586 (arguing that a guardian ad litem is an
insufficient representative for a minor in a judicial bypass proceeding due to the
conflict involved in being a representative of the minor’s wishes versus the minor’s best
interests, which a guardian ad litem is tasked with protecting). Additionally, the
appointment of a guardian ad litem is not required in judicial bypass proceedings,
meaning that this “safeguard” could simply not exist in states that require a clear and
convincing evidence standard. See id. at 585 (noting that states may allow for
appointment of a guardian ad litem in judicial bypass proceedings); see also Akron Ctr.
for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 517–18 (upholding the clear and convincing evidence
standard in the context of a state statute that contained an appointment of guardian
ad litem provision, but not specifying this as a precondition to the permissibility of
imposing a heightened evidentiary standard). But see Ind. Planned Parenthood
Affiliates Ass’n v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1138 (7th Cir. 1983) (requiring appointment
of counsel for minors going through the judicial bypass process, but only for courts in
the Seventh Circuit since this decision was not appealed).
173. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 10 (showing that only six out of the fifteen
states that require clear and convincing evidence in judicial bypass proceedings also
contain specific pleading requirements in their judicial bypass statutes); see also supra
notes 64–65 and accompanying text (noting that only a few states provided specific
criteria for determining “maturity” and “best interests” in judicial bypass proceedings).
174. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (highlighting the reoccurrence of judges
bringing in their own moral convictions and politics into judicial bypass decisions).
175. See supra Section II.A (failing to meet the unconstitutional heightened
evidentiary clear and convincing standard set forth in Whole Woman’s Health).
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Furthermore, since this heightened evidentiary standard constitutes
an undue burden, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Akron Center for
Reproductive Health is negated with respect to the constitutionality of
heightened evidentiary standards in judicial bypass hearings.
Furthermore, procedural safeguards relied on by the Court in this
decision are insufficient to overcome the unduly burdensome nature
of heightened evidentiary standards in judicial bypass proceedings.
Finally, in light of the foregoing conclusions, a model judicial bypass
statute would contain a preponderance of the evidence standard for
the minor, as well as specific descriptions of pleading requirements,176
given the highly subjective nature of the Bellotti factors and the
demonstrated judicial tendency to consider arbitrary indicators,
particularly of maturity, but also of best interests.177 These specific
pleading requirements could include: consultation with a physician,
knowledge of the abortion procedure, knowledge of the alternatives to
abortion, and similarly concrete factors. Because these requirements
can sometimes still amount to ambiguous and arbitrary considerations,
even in the cases of states that have already included specific pleading
requirements in their judicial bypass statutes.178 The specific pleading
requirements, coupled with the preponderance of the evidence
standard, should adequately inform the minor of the requirements of
the process, and be sufficiently clear to provide a fairer proceeding
with more certainty in the potential outcome. Moreover, the inclusion
of specific descriptions of pleading requirements would aid the minor
176. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.85(A) (West 2013) (outlining the specific
information that must be included in a judicial bypass complaint). Another viable
alternative is placing the decision in a physician’s hands, which would be a more direct
way of curing the issues with judicial discretion; however, this Comment will not cover
this alternative extensively, as it does not pertain directly to the issue of evidentiary
standards in judicial bypass proceedings. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20103(c)(1)(i)–(iii) (West 1991) (providing that a physician may bypass the state’s
parental notice requirement if she determines: “(i) Notice to the parent or guardian
may lead to physical or emotional abuse of the minor; (ii) The minor is mature and
capable of giving informed consent to an abortion; or (iii) Notification would not be
in the best interest of the minor”).
177. See, e.g., supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text (examining cases in which
judges denied parental consent waivers for irrelevant reasons, such as the minor’s
demeanor in court).
178. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 390.01114(4)(c) (2011) (requiring factors that necessarily
require a significant amount of judicial discretion, such as overall intelligence,
emotional development and stability, credibility and demeanor as a witness, ability to
accept responsibility, and ability to accept both the immediate and long-term
consequences of her choices).

2018]

CLEARLY UNCONVINCING

1945

and any legal representation she is afforded, in the ability to protect her
fundamental liberty interest, as well as guide the judge presiding over
the hearing away from arbitrary or inappropriate considerations.179
Finally, given the weighty liberty interest at stake, and the rampant
evidence of past trial judges making inappropriate considerations and
determinations, a model judicial bypass statute would require that
appellate courts consider judicial bypass issues de novo, so as to
provide a meaningful check on hearing decisions.180

179. See supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text (demonstrating how the lack of
pleading guidelines produces inconsistent judicial decisions and varied case outcomes).
180. See supra note 16; see also, e.g., Placey, supra note 16, at 732–40 (listing states,
whose judicial bypass statutes require both a preponderance of the evidence standard
and a de novo appellate review).

